decided April 2, 2025
The federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, (the federal “RICO” statute), authorizes civil lawsuits for damages by a “person” who is “injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of” section 1962 [of RICO, listing its “Prohibited Activities”]. See 18 U.S.C. §1964(c). In this case, the Court ruled that a civil RICO lawsuit can be brought, but not necessarily won, by a plaintiff who bases his claim of injury to his “business or property” upon an “antecedent personal injury.” Three Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kavanaugh, dissented from this ruling. They contended that a claim of a “personal injury” that has preceded any claimed injury to “business or property” disqualifies the plaintiff from bringing a civil RICO lawsuit. Both sides contended that the text and context of 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) required their differing interpretations.
COMMENT: The “Civil Remedies” provision of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §1964, and particularly the civil lawsuit authorization of 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), do not contain the words “personal injury,” Therefore the two sides’ arguments over the meaning of those words were irrelevant and moot. The words in the statute actually needing interpretation to resolve this case, and similar cases, are the words “by reason of.” That phrase requires a direct causal relationship between an alleged RICO violation, and a civil plaintiff’s allegation of “injury” to “his business or property.” An intervening cause of injury, if and when shown in a civil RICO lawsuit, should be fatal to that lawsuit under the wording of 11 U.S.C. §1964(c). The Court did not decide that issue of fact in this particular case. That was appropriate.
RECENT RULINGS 