June 5, 2025
The federal statute commonly known as “Title VII” prohibits most instances of racial and sexual discrimination in employment decisions. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(2)(a)(1). To make out a case of illegal discrimination in court, federal trial courts require the plaintiff to prove an instance of illegality with either direct or circumstantial evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Some federal courts, however, have imposed an additional requirement that a reverse-discrimination plaintiff, i.e., a plaintiff who belongs to a class of people who do not usually experience adverse discrimination in employment, to prove unusual circumstances regarding his or her entire class to sustain an ongoing employment discrimination claim. In Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services (US SupCt Slip Opinion of June 5, 2025) the Court ruled that “Title VII” required no such showing of unusual circumstances by a reverse discrimination plaintiff. The Court explained that reverse discrimination, on the basis of an individual’s race or sex (or other “Title VII” criteria) is still illegal, regardless of the employer’s attitude toward the plaintiff’s class as a whole. The Court’s decision and Opinion were unanimous.
Comment: The Court’s decision and Opinion are perfectly consistent with both the text and the evident purpose of the “Title VII” statute. The statute makes no distinctions for so-called reverse discrimination claims.
Dan D. Rhea
RECENT RULINGS 